When the [void] Divorce Decree was issued by Carolyn Carluccio along with a [void] Equitable Distribution which was deliberately and intentionally designed to prevent me from obtaining any by funds which would permit me to pursue further litigation through Appeal… There was talk of this “Unappealable Order of Carolyn Carluccio” which would not permit me to appeal the decision.

Apparently, Carolyn Carluccio hadn’t counted on the incompetence of Angst & Angst… which had to be deliberate because every lawyer knows there are requirements which must be met to ensure jurisdiction and a proper hearing.

BUT…

By intentionally rendering VOID Orders/Judgments, Carolyn Carluccio denied this indigent Defendant immediate access to the Superior Courts and Federal courts, and she was acting as private citizen stripped of her black robe, authority, and immunity.

Carolyn Carluccio also has exposed the prior judges to a similar lack of immunity because of the overall appearance of a conspiracy to deny justice which has persisted throughout the matter all the way back to the issuance of THE SECRET ORDER OF JUDGE RHONDA DANIELE in August 2007.

The Judges deliberate and intentional undermining of the Defendant’s rights is evident.

VOID ORDERS CAN BE ATTACKED AT ANY TIME IN ANY COURT PROVIDED THAT PARTY IS PROPERLY BEFORE COURT

No Notice, No Jurisdiction, No Authority to Grant Relief, and the Judgment is VOID!

“It is fundamental that no judgment or order affecting the rights of a party to the cause shall be made or rendered without notice to the party whose rights are to be affected.” Tyron Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Phelps, 307 S.C. 361, 362, 415 S.E.2d 397, 398 (1992). Generally, a person against whom a judgment or order is taken without notice may rightly ignore it and may assume that no court will enforce it against his person or property. Id.
See Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389. “Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proven to exist.” See also Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215., “There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.” See also Rosemond V. Lambert, 469 F2d 416., The burden shifts to the courts to prove jurisdiction.

If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.) An illegal order is forever void.

1. Four Factors to Determine whether a Judge’s Act is a “Judicial” One

To determine whether a judge’s act is a “judicial” one, the Court is to consider four factors: (1) whether the act complained of is one normally performed by a judge; (2) whether the act occurred in the courtroom or an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the judge; and (4) whether the act arose out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir.1993).

(1) whether the act complained of is one normally performed by a judge: Rainey’s imposing on this indigent Plaintiff the Clerk’s duties to “issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(d), and refusing to reinstate the complaints dismissed sua sponte under Rule 1-041(E)(2) of Rules Enabling Act, which is mandatory, are not acts normally performed by a judge.

(2) whether the act occurred in the courtroom or an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers: The acts neither occurred in the courtroom nor an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers because without service of process, no parties were present, and there was no subject matter before the judge for adjudication;

(3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the judge: Since there was neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction, there was no controversy that centered around any case pending before the judge and

(4) whether the act arose out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity: The decision was made in his administrative, ministerial, non-judicial, non-adjudicative, personal, private-citizen capacity. Without subject matter and parties before him, whatever he did was not done in his judicial, but personal, capacity.

2. There are only two circumstances when a judge is not entitled to judicial immunity: (1) when he performs acts not in his judicial capacity and (2) when he performs act, although judicial in nature, in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). Here, Judge Rainey is not entitled to judicial immunity because (1) when he rendered the Order to Dismiss without prejudice, he was not performing acts in his judicial capacity; he was making an administrative, ministerial, non-judicial, non-adjudicative decision; and (2) when he performs act, although judicial in nature, in the complete absence of all jurisdiction: neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction was present; he was without any authority to hear the case and determine any issue. Neither is Judge Jack entitled to judicial or absolute immunity because without service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915 (d) while the indigent Plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis, she was in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

3. Congress meant to provide individuals immediate access to the federal courts. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).

4. By rendering VOID Orders/Judgments, both judicial officers denied this indigent Plaintiff immediate access to the federal courts, and were acting as private citizens stripped of their black robes, authority, and immunity.

5. In addition, they committed fraud upon the court. “Fraud upon the court” has been defined as that fraud committed by an officer of the court in any attempt to deceive, either by commission, by omission, by speech, by silence, by gesture, by innuendo, by look, etc. Whenever this fraud is committed in a court of law by any attorney or judge, it is a “fraud upon the court”. In re Eugene Lee Armentrout et al., 99 Ill.2d 242, 75 Ill.Dec. 703, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983); Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill.2d 419, 435, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858 (1977); In re Lamberis, 93 Ill.2d 222, 229, 66 Ill.Dec. 623, 443 N.E.2d 549 (1982); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (1985); Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (1948).

6. “Fraud upon the court” has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to “embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.” Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated “a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final.”

7. Since a “fraud upon the court” vitiates the entire case, all the VOID Orders/Judgments rendered by the federal and state courts must be stricken as orders from the court, as none of the courts held subject-matter jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order. U.S.v. Throckmorton, 98U.S.61,25 L.Ed. 93 (1878); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997 (1943); Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co.,169 F.2d 514 (1948); In re Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (N.D. Illinois, 1989); Schwarz v. Schwarz, 27 Ill.2d 140, 188 N.E.2d 673 (1963); Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 614 (1896); Skelly Oil v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App.79, 87 (1st Dist. 1949).

8. Consequently, all the officers of the court, including judges and attorneys that committed fraud upon the various courts, state and federal, are personally liable to the victims for damages.

9. I urge my fellow victims in similar situations to fight back because VOID Orders/Judgments must be set aside:

(1) A “void” judgment, as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. Fritts v. Krugh, Supreme Court of Michigan, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97 (10/13/58).

(2) Void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court, People ex. re. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App.2 Dist. 1994).

Res Judicata, Lache, and Time Limitations are not applicable to Void Orders/Judgments, which must be set aside.

Res judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment which is one which, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect, Allcock v. Allcock 437 N.E. 2d 392 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1982).
“…laches does not run against a void judgment. See Samango v. Hobbs, supra; People’s National Bank of Reynoldsville, to Use of Mottern v. D.&M Coal Co., 124 Pa. Super. 21 A. 452.” Com. v. Miller, 150 A.2d 585, 588 (1959)

A motion to set aside a judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction is not subject to the time limitations of Rule 60(b). See Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986).

A void judgment is one which from the beginning was complete nullity and without any legal effect, Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980).

A void judgment is one which, from its inception, is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind the parties or to support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of enforcement in any manner or to any degree – Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So. 2d 577 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985).

When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).

Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D. 278.

Fraud Upon the Court
No Jurisdiction/No Authority
No Due Process
No Res Judicata
No Laches
No Appeal Necessary

Fraud Upon the Court

1. The plaintiff’s false or misleading statement given under oath concerning issues central to her case amounted to fraud. See Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

2. A void order is an order issued without jurisdiction by a judge and is void ab initio and does not have to be declared void by a judge to be void. Only an inspection of the record of the case showing that the judge was without jurisdiction or violated a person’s due process rights, or where fraud was involved in the attempted procurement of jurisdiction, is sufficient for an order to be void. Potenz Corp. v. Petrozzini, 170 Ill. App. 3d 617, 525 N.E. 2d 173, 175 (1988). In instances herein, the law has stated that the orders are void ab initio and not voidable because they are already void.

3. A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court. See Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. 1999).

4. A void judgment or order is one that is entered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacking the inherent power to enter the particular order or judgment, or where the order was procured by fraud, In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846, (Ill. APp. 1 Dist. 2000).

5. Void judgments generally fall into two classifications, that is, judgments where there is want of jurisdiction of person or subject matter, and judgments procured through fraud, and such judgments may be attacked directly or collaterally, Irving v. Rodriquez, 169 N.E.2d 145, (Ill. app. 2 Dis. 1960).

6. Void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court, People ex. re. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App.2 Dist. 1994).

7. The plaintiff’s false or misleading statement given under oath concerning issues central to her case amounted to fraud. See Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

8. A void judgment is one that has been procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud, or entered by court that did not have jurisdiction over subject matter or the parties, Rook v. Rook, 353 S.E. 2d 756 (Va. 1987).

9. When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner. V. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307 (Colo. 1994).

10. Rule 60(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party. * “Fraud” here, I believe, is related to misrepresentation, or misconduct inflicted upon the opponent(s), and is different from “fraud (up)on the court”. The former is limited to one year for victims to file a motion for relief, while the latter has no time limitations.

11. A motion under Rule 60(b) (1), (2), and (3) must be made no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.

12. There are no time limitations for Rule 60(b) (4) the judgment is void and Rule 60(d) Other Powers to Grant Relief. This rule does not limit a court’s power to: (1) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding; (2) grant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1655 to a defendant must be made who was not personally notified of the action; or (3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.

No Jurisdiction, No Authority to Hear and Rule on a Matter

13. A void judgment is a simulated judgment devoid of any potency because of jurisdictional defects only, in the court rendering it and defect of jurisdiction may relate to a party or parties, the subject matter, the cause of action, the question to be determined, or relief to be granted, Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d 1116, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed. 2d 629 (Colo. 1958).

14. A void judgment is one which has merely semblance, without some essential element, as when court purporting to render it has no jurisdiction, Mills v. Richardson, 81S.E.2d 409 (N.C. 1954).

15. A void judgment is one which has a mere semblance, but is lacking in some of the essential elements which would authorize the court to proceed to judgment, Henderson v. Henderson, 59 S.E.2d 227, (N.C. 1950).

16. A void judgment is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment, State v. Richie, 20 S.W.3d 624 (Tenn. 2000).

17. If the judge does not have judicial authority to hear and rule on a matter, the court is considered coram non judice, and the judge is a trespasser of the law and, under the law, is acting as an imposter. The judge is therefore acting unlawfully. Under U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the judge would be acting in treason to the Constitution.

No Due Process

18. Judgment is a “void judgment” if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Klugh v. U.S., D.C.S.C., 610 F. Supp. 892, 901. See also Voidable judgment.

19. Void judgment is one where court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or entry of order violated due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5-Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell, 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

20. Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 5. Klugh v. U.S., 620 F. Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985).

21. Void judgment may be defined as one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, lacked personal jurisdiction, or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E.2d 741 (Ill. App. Dist. 1993).

22. Void judgment under federal law is one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over dispute or jurisdiction over parties or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law or otherwise acted unconstitutionally in entering judgment, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 N.E.2d 1383 (Ill App. 5 Dist. 1983).

23. Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994, 158 F.R.D. 278.

24. Void judgment is one rendered by court which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in manner inconsistent with due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14, Matter of Marriage of Hampshire, 896 P.2d 58 (Kan.1997)

25. A void judgment is one rendered by a court which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, In re. Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279, (Kan. App. 1999).

26. Here, it is clear from the face of the order confirming sale that Appellant’s due process rights were violated. Thus, the order confirming sale is void on its face and the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter such order. The trial court’s judgment is REVERSED AND this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Duerksen, 810 P.2d 1308, 1991 OK CIV APP 39 (Okla.App.Div.3 04/30/1991).

No Laches/No Time Limit

27. And there is no time limit or laches on an attack on a judgment as void. State v. Lindsey, (1952) 231 Ind. 126, 106 N.E.2d 230; Wright & Miller, supra at § 2862. Wright & Miller are even of the opinion that the reasonable time standard of Federal Trial Rule of Procedure § 60(B) would not apply.

28. Judgment is void if court that rendered it lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction; void judgment is nullity and may be vacated at any time, Matter of Marriage of Welliver, 869 P.2d 653 (Kan. 1994).

29. In re Marriage of Macino, 236 Ill.App.3d 886 (2nd Dist. 1992) (“if the order i[f] void, it may be attacked at any time in any proceeding.”)

30. Evans v Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 565 N.E.2d 724 (2nd Dist. 1990) (“a void judgment, order or decree may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally.”)

31. Oak Park Nat. Bank v Peoples Gas Light & Coke Col, 46 Ill.App.2d 385, 197 N.E.2d 73, 77 (1st Dist. 1964) (“that judgment is void and may be attacked at any time in the same or any other court, by the parties or by any other person who is affected thereby.”).

32. Laches does not operate to preclude the opening or vacating of a void judgment, for the reason that no amount of acquiescence can make it valid.

33. “attempt to invoke laches as a defense is misplaced because the trial court had no jurisdiction or authority to hear the cases in the first place.” Raymond v. Raymond, 343 Ark. 480, 343 Ark. 480, 36 S.W.3d 733, 36 S.W.3d 733 (Ark. 02/01/2001). A judgment rendered without notice to the parties is void; when there has been no proper service and, therefore, no personal jurisdiction over the defendants in a case, any judgment is void ab initio.

34. A void judgment is vulnerable to a direct or collateral attack regardless of the lapse of time. Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, supra [137 Colo. ___, 328 P.2d 379].

No Res Judicata

35. Once the judgment was found to have been rendered without jurisdiction over the defendants, such judgment was void; it was as though suit had never been brought and there was no impediment to bringing the suit where personal jurisdiction over the defendants could be had; a void judgment amounts to nothing and has no force as res judicata. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Coffelt, 301 Ark. 112, 782 S.W.2d 45 (1990).

36. Res judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment which is one which, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect, Allcock v. Allcock, 437 N.E.2d 392 (Ill.App.3 Dist. 1982).

37. A “void” judgment, as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. Fritts v. Krugh, Supreme Court of Michigan, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97 (10/13/58).

38. No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. Fritts v. Krugh, Supreme Court of Michigan, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97 (10/13/58).

39. A void judgment cannot constitute res judicata. Denial of previous motions to vacate a void judgment could not validate the judgment or constitute res judicata, for the reason that the lack of judicial power inheres in every stage of the proceedings in which the judgment was rendered. Bruce v. Miller, 360 P.2d 508, 1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960).

Appeal from a Void Order is Unnecessary

40. Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (stating that appellate court has no jurisdiction over void judgment; appellate court must simply declare such a judgment void and dismiss the appeal). A court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.

41. Other effects of the void judgment rule are that an appellate court must raise the subject matter jurisdiction issue sua sponte and that there can be no waiver of the issue or conferred jurisdiction by consent. Matter of City of Ft. Wayne, (1978) 178 Ind. App. 228, 381 N.E.2d 1093, 1095.

42. There is no . . . discretion on the part of a court reviewing a void judgment Schoffstall v. Failey (1979), Ind.App., 389 N.E.2d 361.

43. It is not necessary to appeal from a void order because it never became effective. A void order is subject to collateral attack. Pendergist v. Pendergist, 267 Ark. 1114, 593 S.W.2d 502 (1980).

One of those whom I believe to be a private investigator told me that MAGLOCLEN did not exist.

The thing is when I said I was curious about the place… the first response should not be “It doesn’t exist.” Because, if it did not exist, wouldn’t you have to ask what it was before jumping to help you to that conclusion.

So when the immediate response came back that it didn’t exist, it raised the question WHY DOES THIS PERSON WANT ME TO BELIEVE THAT THIS PLACE DOES NOT EXIST? What is he concealing?

Well, It exists. And it was within walking distance of the place where the question was asked.

MAGLOCLEN is Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network. It is a resource and data aggregator for law enforcement personnel.
www.riss.net I am not sure why anyone, especially a former constable/private investigator, would find it necessary to hide their existence from me.

To preserve the integrity of the judicial process, the courts always should presume that a trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction.

But, they should permit a litigant to overcome this presumption by showing that the judge acted with actual malice, consisting of a knowing or reckless disregard of due process.

Specifically, if the court is to enjoy immunity, it must afford three things—notice, a chance to be heard, and a method of appeal.

In the matters of the Order of July 18, 2011, and the Order of September 23, 2011, Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio does not enjoy judicial immunity.

1. The Defendant had not been notified of the Plaintiff’s newly filed petitions delivered immediately before both proceedings.
2. The Defendant was not permitted to speak or present exhibits in support of his position on the matters.
3. Carolyn Carluccio has not permitted the Appeal to move forward to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
– Carolyn Carluccio was the ‘signing judge’ on August 15, 2011 when the Appeal was filed.
– Carolyn Carluccio has neglected to hear a Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed concurrently with the Appeal on August 15, 2011.
– Carolyn Carluccio has neglected to hear a Resubmitted Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed on September 19, 2011.
– Carolyn Carluccio has deliberately and intentionally written an opinion which contains irrelevant statements which misinform as to the nature of the Appeal and also applies an improper limitation on the period for filing an Appeal in the Matter.
– Carolyn Carluccio has maliciously, intentionally and fraudulently abused her power under color of law while acting to deny the Defendant his due process rights.
– Carolyn Carluccio has issued a void order without jurisdiction, based on a void order without jurisdiction, to enforce a void order where she lacked jurisdiction. Each subsequent void order sought to further harass and inflict intentional and deliberate harm upon the Defendant.

When unjust injuries are inflicted by improper judicial acts, the state or its insurers should be forced to bear the cost of the wrongful act, not the individual.

In acting with such deliberate action and purpose, Carolyn Carluccio has exposed the similar failures of the prior judges in this matter.

Of these three requirements, the opportunity to appeal should be the most crucial based on the policy that appeal, not a suit for damages, is the preferred method of challenging a judge’s improper actions. Deprivation of an opportunity to appeal effectively renders this policy meaningless and makes some other remedy necessary for proper redress. Moreover, the rightto appeal usually can correct due process violations. Even errors innotice and opportunity to be heard should not ofthemselves subject ajudge to suit as long as the opportunity to appeal is present. In effect, the appeal itself will afford a new opportunity for a proper hearing with proper notice.

The best solution is to give judicial immunity a firm root in due process guarantees. To achieve this result, the simplest approach is to create an irrebuttable presumption of immunity where the statecourt judge’s acts did not deliberately terminate a citizen’s rights without notice, hearing, and opportunity to appeal. Of these three requirements, the chance to appeal is the most important because it provides a means ofcuring defects inany other due process violation.
A judge thus remains unquestionably immune as long as he does not take actions that intentionally and plainly prevent further review.
The duty imposed on a state-court judge, then, is only to recognize that his own decisions may sometimes be in error and to ensure that orders affecting important constitutional rights can be reviewed in another court.